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 A number of commentators have argued that inflation targeting is an idea whose time has 
passed, as, they say, it has proven inadequate to the challenge of dealing with the situations faced by 
many central banks in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.1 Recent developments such as the 
Federal Reserve’s adoption of an explicit quantitative “threshold” value for the unemployment rate in 
December 2012, and Bank of England Governor-designate Mark Carney’s suggestion that there could be 
advantages of a nominal GDP target in a speech that same month (Carney, 2012) have been widely cited 
as evidence of a swelling tide of dissent against inflation-targeting orthodoxy, even among noted former 
proponents and practitioners of inflation targeting.2 
 It is indeed true that recent events expose important disadvantages of a particular conception of 
inflation targeting, one that is reflected in the practical implementation of inflation targeting in many 
countries. This does not, however, mean that an inflation target as such is undesirable, or that a 
superior regime could not be described as a form of inflation targeting. Indeed, what is needed is 
something closer to the ideal version of inflation targeting already advocated for some years in 
theoretical discussions of this approach. 
 It is important, first of all, to recognize that proponents of inflation targeting do not actually 
have in mind a commitment by the central bank to base policy decisions purely on their consequences 
for inflation, and to act so as to keep the inflation rate as close as possible to the target rate at all times. 
Mervyn King (1997) memorably referred to this as the “inflation nutter” position, and distinguished the 
“flexible” inflation targeting that he advocated from it; Ben Bernanke’s advocacy of inflation targeting 
has similarly always taken pains to insist that it would not require a central bank to disregard the 
consequences of its policy for the real economy, and so would not be contrary to the Fed’s “dual 
mandate”(e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999; Bernanke, 2004a).  
 And the theoretical case for inflation targeting has never rested on an assertion that a single-
minded focus on inflation stabilization would achieve the best outcome; while there exist cases in which 
maintenance of a stable inflation rate at all times would be an optimal outcome, the literature has 
stressed how special are the assumptions required in order for this to be true. Quantitative 
investigations of optimal monetary policy in a variety of structural models and under varying 
assumptions about parameters and shocks have instead found as a much more robust conclusion that 
optimal monetary policies involve a low long-run average rate of inflation, and fluctuations in the 
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inflation rate that are not too persistent, so that a correct forecast of inflation a few years in the future 
remains always quite close to the same, constant long-run average inflation rate.  
The essential reason for this conclusion is that while there are important real consequences of 
alternative paths for nominal variables in the short run, the long-run average rate of inflation has little 
consequence for the long-run average value of real variables --- so that there is little cost in terms of 
alternative stabilization objectives of adopting a policy that maintains a constant long-run inflation rate 
despite the occurrence of real disturbances. And indeed, there are important advantages for real 
stabilization objectives of maintaining confidence that the medium-run inflation outlook is not changed 
much when shocks occur. For example, relative constancy of expected inflation results in a stable short-
run Phillips-curve tradeoff as a result of which monetary policy can more successfully stabilize real 
variables in response to transitory shocks, whereas if changes in the rate of inflation were expected to 
be highly persistent, it would be much more difficult for monetary policy to have an effect on real 
variables as opposed to simply affecting inflation.3 
 Hence the literature has argued for the desirability of commitment to an approach to the 
conduct of policy that will ensure that departures of the inflation rate from a definite (relatively low) 
value will not last too long, and that can maintain public confidence in this property of inflation 
dynamics. This is what a commitment to an explicit inflation target is intended to achieve. And in fact, 
those central banks with explicit inflation targets (including the US, since January 2012) always commit 
themselves only to seek to keep inflation near the target rate “over the medium run,” or to aim to 
return the actual inflation rate to the target rate over some horizon two or more years in the future. 
They do not promise to make policy solely with a view to keeping inflation as close as possible to the 
target in the short run, and many central banks’ official descriptions of their policy targets make explicit 
reference to additional stabilization goals that are also to be pursued, subject to the constraint that this 
be done in a way that is consistent with the medium-run inflation target. 
 But while inflation-targeting central banks generally make it clear that the inflation target is only 
to be understood as a medium-run constraint on the conduct of policy, they are often much less clear 
about what does determine an appropriate nearer-term policy. And this is hardly a minor detail, since as 
a practical matter, the decision to be made at any given meeting of a monetary policy committee is only 
a near-term decision: it is a decision about operating targets for the bank’s policy instruments until the 
next meeting (only a few weeks in the future), with the expectation that a similar decision process will 
be repeated afresh when the next meeting occurs. Hence even confidence that a central bank’s policy 
should deliver a certain average rate of inflation “over the medium run” depends on its adopting (and 
being seen to have adopted) a decision procedure for near-term policy decisions that can be expected, 
over time, to deliver that average rate. If a central bank does not explain how its supposed medium-run 
objective determines (or at least constrains) its near-term choices, there may be little confidence in this 
--- or it may evaporate in response to an unexpected shock. 
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 It has sometimes been supposed that simply defining a specific future horizon at which inflation 
should be projected to equal the target suffices to explain how a medium-run inflation target should 
determine near-term policy decisions. For example, in Svensson’s (1997) classic exposition of the idea of 
“inflation-forecast targeting,” in each decision cycle the policy committee chooses the unique current 
operating target for the policy rate (a short-term nominal interest rate) that results in a forecasted 
inflation rate two years in the future equal to the inflation target. This exercise has a determinate 
solution, however, only because the model assumed in the exposition implies that inflation is 
completely unaffected by monetary policy decisions more recent than the meeting two years earlier. 
Thus in focusing on the implications of the current policy decision for projected inflation two years in the 
future, the policy committee is actually looking at the impact of the decision on inflation at the shortest 
horizon for which there is an effect. But this is not a realistic depiction of what actual inflation-forecast 
targeting involves; banks that focus on closing the “inflation gap” only two or more years in the future 
do not do so because they believe that inflation outcomes at shorter horizons are genuinely policy-
invariant, as is clear when projections under alternative hypothetical policy paths are presented.  
Up until 2004, the Bank of England often explained its decision procedure in terms of a 
“constant-interest-rate forecast” of the future evolution of inflation that was presented in the 
introductory section of each Inflation Report. According to Vickers (1998) and Goodhart (2001), in each 
decision cycle, projections of the future evolution of inflation and other variables were produced under 
the assumption that the policy rate would be held constant at one level or another;  the appropriate 
current policy-rate decision was taken to be that interest rate with the property that, if the policy rate 
were to be held at that rate indefinitely, inflation would be projected to precisely equal the target at a 
horizon exactly 8 quarters in the future. (The verification of this condition was presented in the Inflation 
Report by plotting the inflation projection under the assumption of a constant interest rate equal to the 
current policy rate, together with a horizontal line at the level of the inflation target and a dashed 
vertical line at the 8-quarter horizon, allowing the satisfaction of the criterion to be judged by eye.) 
 Because only a one-dimensional family of possible policy paths is considered (alternative 
possible constant interest rates), a criterion involving only the inflation forecast at a single horizon 
suffices to uniquely determine the appropriate choice. But this apparent solution is logically 
inconsistent, because a policy committee that chooses a given policy rate through this procedure does 
not commit itself to actually maintain the policy rate at that level for the next 8 quarters; the decision 
will be reconsidered afresh the following month. This means that it is possible for a constant-interest-
rate projection that justifies choice of a particular policy rate under this criterion to already imply that if 
the economy evolves as currently projected, the same procedure will not allow the bank to maintain the 
policy rate at that same level for more than a few months. (This will be the case if under the constant-
interest-rate forecast, the inflation rate is projected to pass through the target at exactly 8 quarters in 
the future, but to go on to overshoot the target farther in the future.4 ) 
Such a sequential forecast-targeting procedure can only be internally consistent if the exercise 
involves the choice of a non-constant path for the policy rate, with the property that the path chosen at 
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one date will in fact be a model-consistent forecast (that is, one that is consistent with the projected 
evolution of the economy according to the central bank’s model) of the path that should also be chosen 
at any later date, applying the same criterion in the circumstances that are forecasted to exist then. 
Procedures can be designed to have this property; but such a procedure must involve contemplation of 
a flexible class of possible forward paths for policy, as a consequence of which there is no longer a single 
path consistent with the desired medium-run rate of inflation. Instead, it is necessary to have a criterion 
for choosing among alternative near-term transitions paths, each of which would converge to the same 
medium-run state of affairs. 
One still might imagine defining the criterion purely in terms of the rate at which inflation is 
projected to return to the target rate, when it is not already there. But while such a criterion could be 
internally consistent, it would not be economically desirable. For the reason for not always returning the 
inflation rate to the target rate as promptly as possible is not simply (or even primarily) that there are 
distortions created by changes in the rate of inflation (in which case it would indeed make sense to 
target a fixed rate of convergence, regardless of the reason that inflation has strayed from the target). 
Instead, the primary reason is that economic disturbances that shift the short-run relationship between 
inflation and the output gap (or other real variables that are relevant to stabilization objectives) 
sometimes make it too costly in terms of destabilization of these other variables to move inflation 
quickly to the target (or perhaps even to keep it as close to the target as it currently is). Hence a more 
sensible criterion for choosing among alternative feasible transition paths must be one that balances the 
projected degree of continuing departure of the inflation rate from the medium-run target against the 
projected degree of imbalance in other stabilization objectives.  
As a simple example, for a time the Norges Bank included in each issue of its Inflation Report a 
box explaining the criteria used to determine the appropriate forward path for policy at the time of each 
forecast-targeting exercise. In addition to specifying that the inflation rate should be projected to 
converge toward the target rate (without specifying a precise horizon for full convergence), the Bank 
stated that “the inflation gap and the output gap should be in reasonable proportion to each other until 
they close,” and in particular that the two gaps “should normally not be positive or negative at the same 
time.”5  In order to allow visual inspection of the extent to which the projections satisfied this criterion, 
the Bank would present a figure in each Inflation Report in which the projections for its preferred 
measure of inflation and of the output gap were superimposed, allowing verification of the desired 
inverse relationship between them, with the two gaps shrinking to zero together.6  
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 In recent years, the Norges Bank has been less explicit about the nature of the near-term criterion used to 
determine the appropriate forward path of policy, although it still states in each issue of its report (now called 
Monetary Policy Report) that “the interest rate path should provide a reasonable balance between the path for 
inflation and the path for overall capacity utilization in the economy” (Norges Bank, 2012, p. 16), and it still always 
includes the figure superimposing the projected paths for the inflation rate and the output gap under its baseline 
scenario (Norges Bank, 2012, chart 1.18). 
Under such a criterion, it is not necessary to specify separately the rate at which the inflation 
rate should be projected to approach the target rate; the appropriate rate of convergence is exactly the 
rate that allows the output gap to remain in the desired proportion to the inflation gap. (Note that 
under such a criterion, the inflation gap will be projected to close eventually, as long as it is not possible 
to have a non-zero permanent output gap at any finite inflation rate.) In the case of some types of 
disturbances, this might mean that much of the convergence would be expected to occur within 8 
quarters; but under other circumstances, convergence might take substantially longer. Credibility of the 
central bank’s commitment to its medium-run target  would be maintained, and confidence that 
convergence will eventually occur, not on the basis of the rate at which inflation is always observed to 
be converging toward the target rate, but on the basis of the fact that the current size of the inflation 
gap (or at any rate, the gap that is projected over the fairly near term under intended policy) is always 
justified by the current size of the output gap, rather than being allowed to grow disproportionately. 
Adoption of an explicit criterion for deciding upon an appropriate forward path for policy 
becomes especially important in the case that the policy rate reaches its lower bound (or at least a 
barrier that the central bank is unwilling to breach, whether it would be technically feasible or not), as 
has been true in both the US and the UK since the end of 2008. In the absence of an ability to provide 
further stimulus to demand through further immediate cuts in the policy rate, the possibility of 
providing stronger incentives for current spending by creating expectations of looser monetary policy in 
the future than would otherwise have been expected can in principle be an important additional policy 
tool. But an important limit to the effectiveness of such “forward guidance” is the fact that people need 
to be given a reason to believe that policy will in fact be conducted differently in the future, and not 
simply that the central bank currently wishes them to believe this.7 I believe that this can most 
effectively be done by announcing a target criterion that will be used to determine future policy 
decisions, and then demonstrating that policy deliberations are indeed organized around verification of 
the announced criterion. 
The recent calls for new approaches to the conduct of monetary policy, that some have 
interpreted as repudiations of inflation targeting, arise in this context. The Fed’s introduction of a 
threshold for the unemployment, which should be reached before it will be appropriate to begin raising 
the federal funds rate from its current near-zero level (assuming that inflationary expectations remain 
contained), is an attempt to provide assurance that interest rates will remain low for longer than might 
already have been expected on the basis of past conduct. My own proposal (Woodford, 2012b) that the 
Fed commit to maintain its highly accommodative policy until nominal GDP catches up to a target path 
had the same intention, and it is in this context that Bank of England Governor-designate Mark Carney 
has spoken of the possible benefits of a nominal GDP target as well (Carney, 2012). Indeed, Carney’s 
suggestion occurs in the course of a discussion of approaches to the provision of “guidance” about 
future policy, as a form of “unconventional policy” that can deployed when the interest-rate lower 
bound has been reached. 
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 Woodford (2012b) discusses a case in which an announcement by the Riksbank that its policy rate was projected 
to remain at its current  low level for several quarters seems to have had a contractionary effect, rather than the 
desired expansionary one, owing to insufficient credibility of the asserted path of future policy. 
It is true that Carney refers to this option as one that is not “available to a central bank 
operating under flexible inflation targeting,” and says that if its use were required, “the policy 
framework itself would likely have to be changed,” which in Canada “would require the approval of the 
political authority.” Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that he refers here to a specific conception 
of “flexible inflation targeting,” that has indeed been institutionalized in a number of countries, but that 
departs from the ideal advocated by theorists of inflation targeting such as Svensson and Woodford 
(2005). Carney stresses that the point of a nominal GDP level target would be to introduce history-
dependence into a central bank’s policy commitment: the bank would commit itself to subsequently 
make up for any departure from the nominal GDP target path owing to a loss of control of aggregate 
expenditure when the interest-rate lower bound constrains policy, by temporarily targeting a higher 
than usual nominal growth rate in order to get the economy back on the nominal GDP trend path that, 
ideally, it would never have left. This is indeed different from the purely forward-looking approach to 
inflation targeting that is commonly practiced. The forward-looking approach implies that once it 
becomes possible to achieve its target with interest rates not constrained by the lower bound, the 
central bank will simply pursue its normal stabilization objectives, including keeping the rate of inflation 
going forward within fairly narrow bounds.  But an expectation that nominal growth may be insufficient 
for an indeterminate length of time (owing to the lower bound constraint), while it will under no 
circumstances be allowed to exceed its normal rate (when the constraint doesn’t bind), can result in an 
undesirable contractionary bias to expectations about future policy. 
Yet while a commitment to a level path for a variable such as nominal GDP would be a departure 
from current practice, the desirable of such history-dependence has been stressed for some time in 
theoretical accounts of how flexible inflation targeting ought to be pursued.8 Woodford (2008) argues 
for the desirability of history-dependent targeting procedures that incorporate a commitment to error-
correction: a central bank that misses its nominal growth target owing to a misjudgment of the required 
instrument setting should be expected to compensate for this later, once the mistake has become 
evident. To the extent that such error-correction can be anticipated, the expectation that it will occur 
should lead people to take actions that reduce the size of the deviation caused by the central bank’s 
misjudgment, thus improving stabilization outcomes despite the limitations of the real-time information 
available to the central bank, or other constraints on the accuracy of its instrument choices. For this 
reason, it has frequently been argued that price-level targeting rules should have superior properties to 
forward-looking inflation targeting, if people in the economy are themselves forward-looking  -- even 
from the standpoint  of the kind of loss function typically considered to represent the objectives of a 
“flexible inflation-targeting” bank.9 The particular advantages of a commitment to a nominal level target 
when the interest-rate lower bound becomes a binding constraint were stressed by Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) and Svensson (2003), well before the recent crisis. 
Moreover, a commitment to a nominal GDP level path is completely consistent with a 
commitment to a medium-term inflation target. One might choose, for example, a target path for 
nominal GDP with the property that maintenance of nominal GDP near the target path should be 
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expected, with a fairly high degree of confidence, to result in an average inflation rate over the medium 
run equal to the target rate; indeed, I believe that this should be an important constraint on the 
selection of a nominal GDP target path, in the case of a country that already has an inflation target. And 
it is not simply a matter of there being no contradiction between the two commitments. The 
commitment to the nominal GDP level path could reasonably be defended as necessary to a more 
complete description of what the commitment to the inflation target should mean in practice. As argued 
above, the inflation target itself does not suffice to determine what near-term policy decisions should 
be; and yet in the absence of a clear near-term criterion that should generate the desired rate of 
inflation over the medium run, the way in which the central bank’s decision procedure is supposed to 
maintain confidence in a particular medium-run rate of inflation remains obscure. And no inflation-
targeting central bank would actually maintain that the correct near-term criterion should simply be 
minimization of the distance between the actual inflation rate and the target rate, even at short 
horizons.  Hence what is needed is a near-term target criterion, that will not refer simply to inflation, but 
that can be defended as an intermediate target, the pursuit of which in the near term can be expected 
to bring about the desired medium-run inflation rate (without an unnecessary degree of volatility of real 
variables). A nominal GDP level path is an example of a fairly simple target criterion that satisfies these 
requirements.10 
Indeed, despite the view expressed by Governor Carney, I believe that adoption of a nominal 
GDP level path as the criterion for near-term policy decision would involve less of a departure from the 
existing policy commitments of a flexible inflation-targeting central bank than would adoption of a 
“threshold” for the unemployment rate of the kind announced in December 2012 by the Fed. The 
unemployment threshold indicates a numerical objective for a variable other than inflation that cannot 
be defended as an intermediate target that, if achieved, would necessarily deliver the desired rate of 
inflation, over the medium run; it is an objective that would not in itself imply any given rate of inflation, 
and that furthermore could easily conflict with achievement of the desired rate of inflation, even on 
average over a period of many years, if the unemployment target were consistently  pursued over that 
time, in too single-minded a way. Of course, the FOMC’s announcement of an unemployment threshold 
implies no commitment or intention to treat this value as a target in this way, let alone as their sole or 
pre-eminent target. Nonetheless, because the adoption of an unemployment target with a specific 
numerical value would present such a threat to stability of the inflation rate, I believe that even a 
reference to a numerical threshold for unemployment of the kind that the FOMC has made involves 
risks to the credibility of the Fed’s commitment to its medium-run inflation target that would not arise in 
the case of a commitment to a nominal GDP target path. 
The adoption of thresholds also creates problems for the credibility of the medium-run inflation 
target owing to the fact that the thresholds (in order for their announcement to accomplish something) 
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must represent both a departure from past policy and an approach to the conduct of policy that is 
different from what one wants people to anticipate about future policy as well, once the current 
anomalous circumstances are safely in the past. (That is, the thresholds represent neither the criterion 
that would have determined whether a federal funds rate target near zero was appropriate under the 
FOMC’s past approach, nor the criterion that the FOMC should be expected to use after  “exit” from the 
current period of unusual policy accommodation.) But  the problem with adopting temporary thresholds 
of this kind is that it makes evident that the central bank’s quantitative goals for the variables that 
define its stabilization objectives can easily shift from year to year, so that there may be little confidence 
about whether the goals may shift next. A nominal GDP level path --- chosen so as to represent both a 
path that the central bank had wanted to keep the economy near, in order to achieve its previous goals, 
and that, if reattained and followed in the future, should deliver the medium-run inflation rate that one 
wants people to continue to expect after the transition from the current  situation --- need not 
undermine credibility on either account. It implies that the central bank should be expected to maintain 
an unusually accommodative stance of policy for the immediate future, and indeed that it should seek 
to achieve a higher nominal growth rate than usual over  a temporary transition period; but the reason 
for this temporary departure from policy as usual would be clearly tied to the fact that nominal GDP has 
gotten off track to an unusual extent, so that explanation of the anomalous policy in these terms should 
not create doubts about how the bank will behave under more normal circumstances. 
I thus believe that it would be possible to avoid the problems with inflation targeting as 
currently practiced, that have been the focus of recent criticism of inflation targeting as such, while 
retaining the essential features of an inflation targeting regime: not only a public commitment to a fixed 
numerical target for the medium-run rate of inflation, and a commitment to regularly explain how policy 
decisions are consistent with that commitment, but the use of a forecast-targeting procedure as the 
basis both for monetary policy deliberations and for communication with the public about the bank’s 
decisions and their justification. And I believe that it would be desirable to retain these features of 
inflation targeting as it has developed over the past two decades. The key arguments made for the 
desirability of inflation targets prior to the crisis retain their force. Even if it is now all too evident that 
the stabilization of inflation and inflation expectations does not by itself guarantee that macroeconomic 
instability will never be an issue, there remain excellent reasons to believe that success on this 
dimension is conducive to macroeconomic stability more broadly. During the recent crisis, it is likely that 
the high degree of stability of inflation expectations --- owing to the credibility with regard to inflation 
control achieved by many central banks over the previous 15 years --- has reduced the degree of 
instability resulting from a very substantial collapse of aggregate demand on the one hand and sharp 
increases in commodity prices on the other.  
And the need for explicit, quantitative commitments about policy targets if medium-run 
inflation expectations are to remain stable is arguably greater now than it was during the decade prior 
to the crisis --- precisely because the unusual circumstances of the crisis, and the unprecedented policy 
measures required to respond to them, make it much more difficult for the public to know what to 
expect from central bank policy in the future in the absence of explicit guidance.  These dramatic 
actions, while for the most part defensible as responses to a crisis, raise understandable questions about 
the extent to which policy remains in steady hands. The answer to those questions, however, is not to 
declare that the existing policy framework has exhausted its usefulness and start again from scratch. 
Instead, a deeper consideration of the principles that an inflation targeting regime seeks to instantiate 
should make it possible to fine-tune aspects of the practice of inflation targeting, in a way that addresses 
the needs of the current situation while making it clear that the fundamental commitments of the 
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